Tuesday, July 28, 2026

AI 시대의 법률 특권: 미국 연방법원 ACP·AWP 판례 심층 연구

AI 시대의 법률 특권: 미국 연방법원 ACP·AWP 판례 심층 연구

AI 시대의 법률 특권: 미국 연방법원 ACP·AWP 판례 심층 연구

Legal Privilege in the Age of AI: A Deep Dive into U.S. Federal Court Rulings on ACP and AWP
Legal Privilege in the Age of AI: A Deep Dive into U.S. Federal Court Rulings on ACP and AWP

Executive Summary

미국 연방소송과 전자증거개시(eDiscovery) 실무에서 인공지능(AI), 특히 거대언어모델(LLM)의 도입은 법률문서 작성, 증거자료 검토, 소송전략 수립의 방식을 근본적으로 변화시키고 있다. 그러나 대화형 생성형 AI 플랫폼의 확산은 영미법상 양대 비밀보호 제도인 변호사-의뢰인 비밀유지권(Attorney-Client Privilege, ACP)변호사 작업물 보호 원칙(Attorney Work Product Doctrine, AWP)이 AI 이용 환경에서도 그대로 유지될 수 있는지에 관하여 중대한 법적 불확실성을 낳고 있다.

과거 기술지원검토(Technology-Assisted Review, TAR) 환경에서는 변호사가 학습용 시드 세트(Seed Set)를 직접 선별·검증하며 실질적 지도·감독권을 행사했기에 특권 유지에 큰 법리적 장애가 없었다. 반면 현대 생성형 AI 환경에서는 변호사의 관여 없이 의뢰인, 임직원, 본인소송 당사자가 민감한 법률문제와 소송전략을 AI 플랫폼에 직접 입력하는 일이 일상화되면서, 해당 정보가 AI 서비스 제공자라는 제3자에게 공개(Third-Party Disclosure)된 것으로 평가되어 비밀유지권이 포기되거나 작업물 보호가 상실되는지가 핵심 쟁점으로 떠올랐다. 이에 따라 연방증거규칙(FRE) Rule 502와 연방민사소송규칙(FRCP) Rule 26(b)의 해석을 둘러싼 제3자 공개 및 특권 포기(Waiver) 문제가 새로운 소송 분쟁 영역으로 부상하고 있다.

최근 연방지방법원에서 선고된 주요 판례들을 분석해 보면, 법원은 단순히 "AI를 사용하였다"는 사실만으로 일률적인 결론을 내리지 않는다. 사용 주체가 변호사인지 의뢰인·임직원인지, 본인소송 당사자인지 전문가 증인인지, AI 플랫폼이 상용 공개형인지 데이터 학습·외부 제공이 제한된 엔터프라이즈 폐쇄형인지, 그리고 주장하는 보호가 ACP인지 AWP인지에 따라 서로 다른 법적 기준이 적용된다. 아직 통일된 판례법리가 확립되었다고 보기는 어렵지만, 이용자의 비밀유지에 대한 합리적 기대, 플랫폼 약관과 데이터 처리 구조, 변호사의 관여·감독 정도, 그리고 정보가 소송을 예상하여 준비된 것인지가 공통 판단요소로 자리 잡고 있다.

핵심 결론: 상용 공개형 AI의 자발적 사용은 ACP를 영구 파기시키는 반면, 변호사 주도의 엔터프라이즈 폐쇄형 AI 활용은 AWP의 방패 뒤에 놓일 수 있다. 그 경계는 플랫폼의 기술적 아키텍처와 인간 변호사의 개입 여부에 의해 결정된다.

이 글에서는 2024년부터 2026년까지 선고된 8건의 연방판례를 IRAC 프레임워크로 심층 분석하여, 생성형 AI 이용이 ACP·AWP에 미치는 영향과 그 경계가 정확히 어디에서 갈리는지 추적한다. 나아가 기업과 법률실무자가 지금 점검해야 할 AI 거버넌스 체크리스트와 구독 플랜별 리스크를 함께 제시하여, "어떤 AI를 누가 어떻게 사용해야 특권을 지킬 수 있는가"라는 실무적 질문에 답한다.


판례 개관: 핵심 8개 사건 종합표

미국 연방법원에서 AI, LLM 및 자동화 검토 기술의 특권 인정 여부와 디스커버리 범위를 직접 다룬 핵심 사건들을 정리하면 다음과 같다.

사건명 법원·연도 AI 유형 핵심 쟁점 결론 (Holding)
United States v. Heppner S.D.N.Y. 2026 Anthropic Claude (공개형) 의뢰인 독자 생성 AI 문서의 ACP/AWP 성립 및 포기 여부 특권 부인·전면 개시
Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc. E.D. Mich. 2026 OpenAI ChatGPT (상용형) Pro Se 원고의 AI 활용물에 대한 AWP 적용 여부 작업물 보호 인정
Morgan v. V2X, Inc. D. Colo. 2026 생성형 AI·LLM Pro Se 원고의 AI 도구명 개시 의무 및 보호명령 조건 도구명 개시 인정·보호명령 제정
Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc. N.D. Cal. 2024 OpenAI ChatGPT 변호사 작성 프롬프트의 의견 작업물 해당 여부 의견 작업물 보호·포기 제한
Concord Music Group v. Anthropic PBC N.D. Cal. 2025 Anthropic Claude Engine 변호사 작성 조사용 프롬프트의 AWP 성립 및 포기 범위 의견 작업물 인정·부분 생산
Conservation Law Foundation v. Shell Oil Co. D. Conn. 2026 Azure OpenAI GPT-4o (사설 서버) 전문가 증인이 사용한 AI 프롬프트의 개시 의무 개시 명령 (이의제기로 집행정지 중)
Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe S.D.N.Y. 2012 TAR (Predictive Coding) eDiscovery 내 TAR 시드셋 및 프로토콜 개시 의무 TAR 프로토콜 승인
In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Litig. N.D. Ind. 2013 TAR Seed Sets 비관련·특권 비공개 시드셋의 강제 개시 가능 여부 시드셋 강제 개시 기각

개별 판례 심층 분석 (IRAC Framework)

1. United States v. Heppner (S.D.N.Y. 2026) — ACP·AWP 전면 부인

United States v. Heppner, No. 25-cr-00503-JSR, 2026 WL 436479 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026)
담당 판사: Jed S. Rakoff 지방법원 판사 | 결론: 특권 전면 부인·완전 개시

사실관계

피고인 Bradley Heppner는 연방 증권사기 등 5개 혐의로 대배심 소환장을 수령한 후, 선임 변호인의 지시나 감독 없이 독자적으로 Anthropic의 상용 공개형 AI 서비스인 'Claude'에 접속하였다. 피고인은 변호인과 나누었던 상담 정보 및 자신의 방어 논리를 프롬프트로 입력하여 총 31개의 분석 보고서를 생성하였고, 이를 사후에 변호인에게 전달하였다. FBI의 압수수색 과정에서 해당 AI 생성 문서들이 압수되자, 피고인 측은 ACP 및 AWP에 의한 보호를 주장하며 정부 검찰팀의 열람 차단을 신청하였다.

쟁점 및 판결 이유

Rakoff 판사는 ACP 성립의 3요소—자격을 갖춘 인간 변호사와의 커뮤니케이션, 기밀성 유지, 법률 자문 취득 목적—를 확인한 뒤, Claude는 변호사가 아니며 신의성실 의무를 지는 변호사-의뢰인 관계를 형성할 수 없다고 판시하였다. Anthropic의 개인정보처리방침은 사용자 입력값을 수집·학습하고 분쟁 발생 시 규제기관에 공개할 수 있음을 명시하고 있으므로, 피고인은 기밀성에 대한 합리적 기대를 가질 수 없었다.

AWP 관점에서도 법원은, 변호인이 AI 검색을 지시하거나 감독하지 않았으므로 해당 문서들이 변호사의 정신적 작업물이나 전략을 담은 것으로 볼 수 없다고 판단하였다. 또한 비특권 문서를 사후에 변호사에게 전송하더라도 소급하여 특권이 부여되지 않는다는 Upjohn Co. v. United States의 전통적 법리도 재확인되었다.

실무적 함의

이 판결은 공개형 AI와의 대화 기록이 사실상 '공개 서류'와 동일하게 취급될 수 있음을 경고한다. 의뢰인이 상담 내용을 공개형 AI에 입력하는 행위는 법정 밖의 대화를 공개하는 것과 동일한 법적 결과를 초래한다.

2. Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc. (E.D. Mich. 2026) — Pro Se 당사자의 AI 활용물에 AWP 인정

Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-12333, 2026 WL 373043 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026)
담당 판사: Anthony P. Patti 치안판사(Magistrate Judge) | 결론: 작업물 보호 인정·개시 기각

사실관계 및 쟁점

고용차별 민사소송에서 변호사 없이 스스로를 대리하는 본인소송 당사자(Pro Se Plaintiff) Sohyon Warner는 소장 및 준비서면 작성, 소송 전략 정리를 위해 ChatGPT를 활용하였다. 피고 Gilbarco 측은 원고가 소송 관련 정보를 제3자인 ChatGPT에 입력함으로써 모든 특권을 포기했다고 주장하며, 원고의 AI 프롬프트, 입력 기록, 출력값 일체의 제출을 구하는 디스커버리 강제신청(Motion to Compel)을 제출하였다.

판결 이유

Patti 치안판사는 FRCP Rule 26(b)(3)(A)가 변호사뿐만 아니라 "당사자 본인 또는 그 대리인"이 소송을 예견하여 작성한 자료에도 AWP를 부여한다는 점을 강조하였다. Pro Se 당사자는 스스로의 변호인 역할을 수행하므로, AI를 활용해 정리한 소송 준비 자료는 당사자 작성 작업물(Party-prepared Work Product)에 해당한다.

특히 법원은 "ChatGPT를 비롯한 생성형 AI 프로그램은 제3자(Person)가 아니라 업무 도구(Tool)에 불과하다"는 원칙을 정립하였다. AI 서버 관리자가 존재한다는 이유만으로 소송 상대방에게 노출되었다고 볼 수 없으므로, AI 도구 사용 자체로는 AWP 보호가 파기되지 않는다.

3. Morgan v. V2X, Inc. (D. Colo. 2026) — AI 도구명 개시 + 보호명령 기준 정립

Morgan v. V2X, Inc., No. 25-cv-01991 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2026)
담당 판사: Maritza Dominguez Braswell 치안판사 | 결론: AI 도구명 개시 인정·보호명령 3대 요건 제정

고용차별 소송의 Pro Se 원고 Archie Morgan은 소송 준비에 생성형 AI를 사용하였다. 법원은 AI 활용 자료의 AWP 속성을 재확인하면서도, AI 도구의 단순한 명칭이 변호사나 당사자의 내면적 소송 전략을 직접 드러내지 않는 비특권 사실(Non-privileged Fact)에 해당하므로, 상대방의 보안 위험성 평가를 위해 도구명 개시가 허용된다고 판시하였다.

이와 함께 법원은 기밀 서류를 AI에 입력하기 위해 충족해야 할 3대 필수 계약 요건을 명시하였다.

  • Zero-Training: AI 공급사의 입력 데이터 모델 재학습 금지
  • Non-Disclosure: 서비스 제공 목적 외 제3자 노출 금지
  • Data Retention Erasure: 당사자 요청 시 입력·출력 데이터의 영구 삭제 권한

4. Tremblay v. OpenAI / Concord Music Group v. Anthropic (N.D. Cal. 2024~2025) — 변호사 작성 프롬프트의 절대적 의견 작업물 보호

Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc., 2024 WL 3748003 & Concord Music Group v. Anthropic PBC, 2025 WL 1482734
법원: N.D. Cal. | 결론: 의견 작업물 인정·포기 제한

저작권 침해 집단소송에서 원고 측 변호사들은 피고 AI 모델의 무단 복제를 입증하기 위해 치밀하게 설계된 검증용 프롬프트를 사용하였다. 피고들은 원고가 소장에 일부 출력 결과를 인용함으로써 프롬프트 전체에 대한 포괄적 권리상실(Subject Matter Waiver)이 발생했다고 주장하였다.

연방법원은 AI 프롬프트가 단순한 키워드 검색을 넘어 변호사가 사건의 법적 쟁점을 파악하고 상대방의 위법성을 입증하기 위해 설계한 목적적 논리 구조라고 판시하였다. 이는 변호사의 고유한 정신적 인상(Mental Impressions)과 법적 평가를 직접 반영하므로 완전한 비공개가 원칙인 의견 작업물(Opinion Work Product)로서 보호된다. 또한 소장에 일부 결과를 인용했더라도, 미원용 프롬프트나 내부 설정 로그 전체로 특권 포기 효과가 확산되지 않는다고 명확히 제한하였다.

5. Conservation Law Foundation v. Shell Oil Co. (D. Conn. 2026) — 전문가 증인 AI 프롬프트는 전면 개시

Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., Civil No. 3:21-cv-00933 (D. Conn. May 18, 2026)
담당 판사: Thomas O. Farrish 치안판사 | 결론: 전문가 AI 프롬프트 강제 개시

환경 오염 민사소송에서 원고 측 전문가 증인 Dr. Naomi Oreskes는 피고가 제출한 방대한 문서군을 검토·분류하기 위해 사설 Azure OpenAI(GPT-4o) 시스템을 활용하였다. Farrish 치안판사는 전문가 증인의 의견 형성 과정에서 데이터 범위를 규정한 AI 프롬프트가 단순한 내부 메모가 아니라 과학적·학술적 분석의 핵심 방법론(Methodology)을 구성한다고 판시하였다.

상대방 당사자는 전문가가 증언의 기초로 삼은 정보 집합이 어떻게 추출되었는지, AI의 환각(Hallucination)이나 편향된 프롬프트가 개입되지 않았는지를 교차 검증할 법적 권리를 갖는다. 또한 Rule 29 당사자 합의문에서 "메모 및 초안 보호" 조항만으로는 AI 프롬프트의 개시 의무를 배제할 수 없으며, AI 프롬프트 배제 여부를 명시적으로 포함해야 한다는 기준도 함께 정립되었다.

다만 이 명령은 치안판사 단계의 결정으로, 원고 측이 지방법원에 이의를 제기하면서 그 집행이 정지된 상태다. 전문가 방법론의 discoverability에 관한 최초의 판단이라는 점에서 상징성은 크지만, 아직 최종 확정된 법리로 단정하기는 이르다.


비교 분석: ACP vs. AWP — AI 적용 엄격성 비교

ACP와 AWP는 보호 목적, 주체 요건, 제3자 공개 시 포기 성립 기준에서 구조적 차이를 보인다.

비교 항목 ACP (변호사-의뢰인 비밀유지권) AWP (작업물 보호 원칙)
법적 근거 연방공통법 / FRE 501 FRCP Rule 26(b)(3)
주체 요건 반드시 면허를 가진 인간 변호사와 의뢰인 간 관계 필요 변호사, 의뢰인, Pro Se 당사자 및 그 대리인 포함
비밀성 요건 엄격한 기밀성 요구. 제3자 노출 시 원칙적 포기 상대방(Adversary)에 대한 노출 방지에 집중
공개형 AI 사용 시 위험도 극히 높음. 서비스 약관상 데이터 수집 허용 시 즉시 포기 상대적으로 유연. AI를 적대적 제3자가 아닌 '도구'로 평가
Kovel Doctrine 적용 상용 공개형 AI에는 적용 불가 Enterprise Closed AI에 확장 적용 가능
AI 활용 시 보호 가능성 극도로 낮음 (공개형 AI 사용 시 Waiver 성립) 높음 (변호사 지시 및 기밀 유지 조건 충족 시)

변호사-의뢰인 비밀유지권(ACP)은 법적 자격을 갖춘 인간 변호사와의 직접적이고 기밀한 소통만을 보호 대상으로 삼기 때문에, 변호사가 아닌 AI 시스템에 직접 입력된 정보는 커뮤니케이션 성립 자체가 부인된다. 반면 AWP는 소송 상대방과의 무기대등을 확보하기 위한 제도이므로, 변호사나 소송 당사자가 AI를 효율적인 분석 도구로 활용하여 만든 생성물에 대해서는 보다 광범위한 보호가 부여된다.

AI 서비스 유형별 법적 보호 비교

분석 지표 상용 공개형 AI (Public/Consumer AI) 엔터프라이즈 폐쇄형 AI (Enterprise Closed AI)
데이터 보관·학습 입력값·출력값을 모델 재학습에 활용 고객 데이터의 모델 학습 이용을 계약으로 금지 (Zero-Training SLA)
제3자 공개 조항 법적 절차, 규제기관 요구, 분쟁 시 임의 공개 가능 엄격한 B2B 기밀유지 계약(NDA) 체결. 사전 통지 의무
기밀성에 대한 합리적 기대 부정됨. 약관 동의 시 기밀성 포기로 간주 인정됨. 합리적 보안 조치를 취한 것으로 평가
Kovel Doctrine 적용 적용 불가능 (독립된 상업적 제3자) 확장 적용 가능 (변호사의 지시를 받는 기술적 조력자)
ACP 유지 가능성 극도로 낮음 (Waiver 성립) 높음 (변호사 지시 및 기밀 유지 시)
AWP 유지 가능성 낮음~보통 (변호사 지시 여부에 따라 분리) 극도로 높음 (변호사 작성 및 전략 반영 시)

연방법원이 정립한 4대 공통 법리

① ACP 특권 포기(Waiver) 성립 기준

연방증거법 Rule 502 체계하에서 의뢰인이 AI 서비스에 비밀 정보를 입력할 때, 해당 AI 플랫폼의 개인정보처리방침이 데이터를 수집·보유·학습하거나 규제기관 및 제3자에게 공개할 수 있는 권리를 보유하고 있다면, 의뢰인은 법적으로 "비밀성에 대한 합리적 기대(Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality)"를 상실한다. 이는 자발적 제3자 공개에 해당하여 ACP의 완전한 포기(Waiver)를 구성한다. 비특권 상태에서 AI로부터 생성된 문서는 사후에 변호사에게 전송되더라도 소급하여 ACP 보호가 발생하지 않는다.

② AWP와 Human-in-the-Loop 원칙

AI가 생성한 초안, 법적 리서치 보고서, eDiscovery 검토 요약서가 AWP—특히 의견 작업물(Opinion Work Product)—로 보호받기 위해서는 인간 변호사의 주도적 개입이 필수적이다. 변호사가 프롬프트를 설계하고, AI의 출력을 검증·수정하며, 이를 소송 전략에 통합하는 "Human-in-the-Loop" 구조가 입증되어야 한다. 다만 본인소송 당사자(Pro Se)는 스스로 대리인 역할을 겸하므로 예외적으로 독자적 AI 활용물에 대해 당사자 작성 작업물 보호를 주장할 수 있다.

③ Kovel Doctrine의 AI 확장 적용 기준

United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) 법리에 따르면, 변호사의 법률 자문을 조력하기 위해 고용된 제3자에게 정보를 공개하는 것은 ACP를 포기한 것으로 보지 않는다. AI 서비스 제공업체가 이 법리상 '변호사의 기술적 조력자'로 인정받으려면 다음 세 가지 요건을 모두 충족해야 한다.

  • AI 플랫폼의 도입 및 구동이 변호사의 직접적인 지시와 통제하에 이루어져야 하고,
  • AI Vendor가 제공하는 시스템이 변호사의 법률 자문을 제공하는 데 필수적인 데이터 해석·분석 기능을 수행해야 하며,
  • 계약상(SLA) 입력 및 출력 데이터에 대한 완전한 기밀성이 보장되고 데이터 재학습 금지 및 외부 공개 차단 조치가 명시되어 있어야 한다.

④ AI 관련 디스커버리 대상 범위

구분 항목 디스커버리 인정 여부 근거 판례
변호사 작성 프롬프트 개시 면제 의견 작업물로서 절대적 보호 (Tremblay, Concord Music)
전문가 증인 프롬프트 전면 개시 감정 방법론으로 개시 대상 (Conservation Law Foundation)
의뢰인 독자 입력 프롬프트 전면 개시 AWP 부인 + 제3자 공개로 ACP 포기 (Heppner)
AI 도구 식별명 (Brand Name) 개시 인정 비특권 사실 데이터 (Morgan)
TAR 시드셋 조건부 면제 변호사의 문서 선별 전략 반영 시 AWP 인정 (In re Biomet)

실무 대응 지침: AI 거버넌스 체크리스트

1. 기업 및 로펌 AI 거버넌스 구축

  • 상용 공개형 AI 사용 전면 금지: 사내 임직원 및 법무팀이 법률 현안, 계약서, 소송 자료를 공개형 AI(Public ChatGPT, Public Claude 등)에 입력하는 행위를 Acceptable Use Policy(AUP)로 금지하고 전산망 차단을 이행한다.
  • 엔터프라이즈 SLA 3대 조항 확보: Zero Data Retention(ZDR)/No-Training, Air-Gapped & Dedicated Tenant 환경, Immediate Erasure Right를 계약에 명시한다.

2. Human-in-the-Loop 워크플로우

  • 변호사의 명시적 지시서 작성: 소송·규제 조사와 관련하여 AI를 활용할 경우, "선임 변호사의 지시와 감독하에 소송 준비 목적으로 AI를 활용함"을 명시한 서면 지시서를 사전에 작성·보관한다.
  • 프롬프트 내 기밀 직접 입력 지양: 사건 관련자의 실명, 고유 식별 정보 등을 직접 입력하기보다 가명화(Pseudonymization) 또는 추상화된 변수를 사용한다.

3. 문서 표식 및 데이터 관리

  • 명시적 특권 표식: AI를 통해 생성된 법률 검토 보고서 상단에 "PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL — ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED & ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT"를 명확히 기재한다.
  • 커뮤니케이션 채널 분리: 비즈니스적 논의 스레드와 AI를 활용한 법률 전략 논의 스레드를 완벽히 분리하여 혼합 목적 문서로 인한 특권 부인 리스크를 방지한다.

4. 소송·디스커버리 절차 대응

  • FRE 502(d) 클로백 명령(Clawback Order) 확보: 디스커버리 개시 초기, 실수로 제출된 특권 문서가 본 소송 및 타 소송에서 특권 포기를 구성하지 않는다는 내용의 법원 승인 명령을 확보한다.
  • AI/TAR ESI Protocol 사전 합의: 생성형 AI나 TAR을 도입할 경우, 상대방과 AI 활용 범위, 검증 방식, 프롬프트·시드셋의 특권 보호 범위를 명시한 ESI Protocol을 합의하여 법원에 제출한다. 전문가 증인이 AI를 활용할 경우에는 Rule 29 합의서에 AI 프롬프트 및 시스템 질의 로그가 비개시 대상임을 명시적으로 규정한다.
  • ABA 윤리 규정 준수: ABA Model Rule 1.1(기술적 숙련도 의무) 및 Rule 1.6(기밀유지 의무)에 따라 사용 중인 AI 도구의 정보보안 구조를 지속적으로 점검한다.

LLM 모델 구독 플랜별 리스크 검토: 실무 시사점

판례 법리를 실무에 적용할 때, 법률 전문가와 기업 법무팀이 가장 직접적으로 마주하는 문제는 현재 사용 중인 AI 구독 플랜이 어느 수준의 특권 보호를 보장하는가이다. 동일한 AI 서비스라 하더라도 계약 형태—소비자용(Consumer)인지 기업용(Business/Team)인지—에 따라 ACP와 AWP의 존속 가능성은 구조적으로 달라진다.

① 소비자용(Consumer) 플랜의 한계

ChatGPT Pro, Gemini Pro, Claude Pro 등 유료 개인 계정에 적용되는 소비자용 약관 플랜은, 사용자가 환경 설정에서 '모델 학습' 또는 '활동 저장'을 거절하더라도 계약상 기업 수준의 기밀유지의무(Confidentiality Covenant)가 체결되지 않은 상태로 간주될 수 있다. 이 경우 연방증거법(FRE) Rule 502 체계하에서 제3자 공개에 따른 ACP는 일률적으로 상실될 가능성이 높다.

다만 시크릿 모드(Incognito/Private Mode)로 작업한 경우에는 ACP와 AWP가 모두 유지될 가능성이 있다. 그러나 이 경우에도 해당 세션의 기밀성—데이터가 서버에 저장되지 않았음, 모델 재학습에 활용되지 않았음—을 당사자가 직접 입증해야 하는 부담이 남는다는 점에 유의해야 한다.

② AWP(작업물보호)의 상대적 격리성

소비자용 플랜이라 할지라도, '학습 제외 설정'이 적용된 상태 또는 시크릿 모드에서 변호사(또는 Pro Se 당사자)가 소송 준비 목적으로 AI를 직접 구동할 경우, AI 플랫폼은 단순한 '업무 도구(Tool)'로 평가받아 AWP는 소송 상대방에 대한 제출 거부의 방패로 유지될 수 있다(Warner v. Gilbarco 법리).

이 지점에서 ACP와 AWP의 구조적 비대칭성이 실무상 핵심 분기점이 된다. ACP는 기밀 커뮤니케이션의 성격에 집중하므로 약관상 데이터 처리 가능성만으로도 즉시 붕괴되지만, AWP는 소송 상대방에 대한 노출 여부에 집중하므로, AI 플랫폼이 상대방 당사자가 아닌 한 '적대적 제3자(Adversary)'에 해당하지 않는다는 논리가 작동할 여지가 있다.

③ 기업용(Business/Team) 플랜의 필수성

United States v. Kovel 법리에 따라 AI 공급사를 변호사의 '기술적 조력자'로 정당화하고 ACP와 AWP를 동시에 두텁게 보호받으려면, Customer Content가 기밀정보로 명시되는 ChatGPT Business, Claude Team, Google Workspace Business 수준 이상의 엔터프라이즈 B2B 계약 체결이 바람직하다. 소비자용 플랜이더라도 시크릿 모드로 작업할 경우 ACP와 AWP가 유지될 여지가 있으나, 그 기밀성을 사후적으로 입증해야 하는 부담 때문에 분쟁 발생 시 법적 불확실성이 현저히 높아진다. 다만 아래 평가는 현재까지 선고된 판례들이 다룬 요건(약관상 데이터 처리 가능성, 변호사 감독 여부, 상대방 노출 여부)을 계약 유형별로 유추 적용한 실무적 전망이며, 기업용·엔터프라이즈 플랜의 특권 유지 자체를 직접 인정한 판례는 아직 없다는 점을 유의해야 한다.

플랜 유형 대표 서비스 ACP 유지 가능성 AWP 유지 가능성 Kovel 조력자 인정 실무 권고
소비자용 (일반 모드) ChatGPT Pro, Gemini Pro, Claude Pro (유료 개인 계정, 학습 설정 ON) 상실 위험 극대 제한적 유지 가능 인정 불가 법률 관련 입력 금지
소비자용 (학습 제외 설정 또는 시크릿 모드) ChatGPT Pro, Gemini Pro, Claude Pro (유료 개인 계정, 학습 제외 설정 또는 시크릿 모드) 불확실 (입증 부담 존재) Warner 법리 원용 가능 인정 불가 제한적 활용 가능; 기밀성 입증 문서화 필수
기업용 (Business/Team) ChatGPT Business, Claude Team, Google Workspace Business 양호할 것으로 전망 (계약상 기밀성 보장) 양호할 것으로 전망 요건 충족 시 인정 가능 법률 관련 업무에 권장
엔터프라이즈 (Zero-Training SLA) Claude Enterprise, Azure OpenAI Dedicated, Air-Gapped 시스템 매우 양호할 것으로 전망 매우 양호할 것으로 전망 Kovel 조력자 인정 가능 소송·기밀 업무에 가장 안전한 선택지

결론적으로, 현재의 판례 법리를 구독 플랜 관점에서 단순화하면 다음과 같다. 소비자용 플랜에서의 AI 사용은 ACP를 거의 확실히 파기시키며, AWP는 조건부로 유지될 수 있다. 기업용·엔터프라이즈 플랜은 계약상 기밀유지의무를 명시함으로써 ACP·AWP 방어에 가장 안정적인 법적 토대를 제공할 것으로 전망되지만, 이는 기존 판례의 논리를 계약 유형에 유추 적용한 실무적 예측이며 법원이 엔터프라이즈 AI의 특권 유지를 직접 인정한 사례는 아직 없다. 소비자용 플랜에서 시크릿 모드나 학습 제외 설정은 리스크를 경감시킬 수 있으나, 이를 분쟁 발생 시 법원에서 입증해야 한다는 현실적 부담을 감안할 때 법률 업무의 전면적인 의존 수단으로는 부적절하다.


결론

미국 연방법원의 최신 판례 경향은 AI라는 최첨단 기술의 등장에도 불구하고 영미법의 전통적인 특권 법리의 기본 틀을 엄격하게 유지하고 있음을 분명히 보여준다. United States v. Heppner 판결이 경고하듯이, 변호사의 감독 없는 공개형 AI 사용은 의뢰인의 비밀유지권(ACP)을 파기시킨다. 반면 Warner v. Gilbarco, Morgan v. V2X가 확인하듯, 변호사의 주도하에 적절한 보안 조치와 소송 대비 목적으로 사용되는 AI는 AWP의 방패 뒤에 놓일 수 있다.

기업과 로펌은 생성형 AI를 단순한 생산성 향상 도구로만 접근할 것이 아니라, eDiscovery 및 증거법상 특권 유지 전략의 핵심 요소로 재정립해야 한다. 엔터프라이즈 폐쇄형 AI 인프라 구축, 변호사 중심의 프롬프트 제어, Human-in-the-Loop 검증 절차, 그리고 FRE 502(d) 클로백 명령의 적극적 활용만이 AI 시대의 미국 소송에서 소송 전략의 기밀성을 방어할 수 있는 경로다.


참고 자료

  • ACP & AWP AI Governance and eDiscovery 2026 (내부 연구 자료)
  • Ross Brodskiy, Brief on AI Tools, Privilege, and Work Product in post United States v. Heppner, Medium (2026)
  • AI 2035: The Legal Profession and the Judiciary in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, The Chicago Bar Association
  • Kirkland Alert, A Federal Court Charts a Path on AI Protective Orders and Work Product in Discovery (May 2026)
  • Mayer Brown, Court Orders Disclosure of Expert Witness's AI Prompts: What Litigators Need to Know (June 2026)

© 2026 All rights reserved. 본 자료는 법률 정보 제공 목적으로 작성되었으며, 구체적인 법적 자문을 대체하지 않습니다.

Can a Human Who Invents with AI Be a Recognized Inventor?

Can a Human Who Invents With AI Be the Inventor?

Can a Human Who Invents
With AI Be the Inventor?

Four types of AI-assisted invention, and the "evidence of human conception" companies need to preserve

An era of humans and AI inventing together — revisiting the standard for inventorship under patent law
In AI-assisted invention, patent law does not ask "how creative was the AI?" It asks which natural person conceived the specific technical concept of the claimed invention.

Generative AI has moved well past being a mere search, translation, or calculation tool. It analyzes technical problems, searches a vast design space, and proposes candidate mechanical structures, compounds, algorithms, and control schemes. Human researchers then screen the AI's output, run experiments, diagnose why something failed, and revise the conditions until the technology is complete.

We have entered an era in which a substantial share of invention forms not in a single, linear train of human thought, but through repeated back-and-forth between humans and AI. So who should count as the inventor in this kind of AI-assisted invention? Answering that correctly means starting not from "how creative was the AI" or "did the human contribute more than the AI," but from this question:

Which natural person conceived the specific technical concept of the invention as ultimately claimed?


1. The Evolution of USPTO Guidance and Its Core Legal Principles

1.1 The February 2024 Guidance: Extending Joint-Inventorship Doctrine to AI-Assisted Invention

In February 2024, the USPTO issued its first inventorship guidance for AI-assisted invention. The guidance started from the premise that using AI does not, by itself, foreclose patent protection — but at least one natural person still needs to have made a sufficient contribution to the claimed invention. To make that determination, the USPTO borrowed the three factors courts have long used to assess joint inventorship among multiple natural persons under Pannu v. Iolab Corp. Under the 2024 guidance, examiners were to assess, on a claim-by-claim basis, whether a natural person made what the guidance called a significant contribution to the claimed invention.

A Word of Caution It would be a mistake to read the 2024 guidance as "a standard for quantitatively comparing how much the human contributed versus how much the AI contributed." That guidance never recognized AI as a legal joint inventor either. The Pannu doctrine is designed to assess each natural person's contribution when multiple humans collaborate to complete an invention; applying it to a human-AI scenario created a structural confusion, making it sound as though the human and the AI were potential co-inventors.

1.2 The November 2025 Revised Guidance: A Full Rescission of the 2024 Guidance

The USPTO announced revised guidance on November 26, 2025, and published it in the Federal Register on November 28, 2025, rescinding the February 2024 guidance in its entirety.

The Core Principle of the 2025 Revised Guidance AI-assisted inventions are not subject to any separate inventorship standard. An AI system is a tool used by a natural person, no different in kind from laboratory equipment, computer software, a database, or a simulation program. Even where AI generates a vast number of candidates and plays a substantial computational and generative role in the inventive process, the AI itself cannot be an inventor. At the same time, the mere fact that AI was used does not diminish or negate a human's inventorship either.

Where a single natural person uses AI, the Pannu factors are not applied to compare the human's contribution against the AI's, because there is no joint-inventorship question between a human and an entity that is legally incapable of being an inventor in the first place. Joint inventorship among humans only becomes an issue where multiple natural persons used AI together.

1.3 The Analytical Framework as of 2025–2026

ScenarioGoverning DoctrineCore Question
One human and an AI Traditional conception doctrine Did the human conceive the specific solution recited in the claim?
Multiple humans and an AI Conception doctrine plus the Pannu factors Was each human's contribution qualitatively significant?
AI generates the specific solution entirely on its own Possible absence of any natural-person inventor Does a natural person who conceived the claimed invention even exist?
Human conceives, AI verifies/computes Traditional conception doctrine Was AI used as an implementation/verification tool?
The Core Shift The 2025 revised guidance moves away from asking "did the human contribute more than the AI?" and returns to the traditional question: "which natural person does conception of the claimed invention belong to?"

2. What Is Conception?

2.1 Conception Is the Touchstone of Inventorship

Under U.S. patent law, the touchstone of inventorship is conception. The Federal Circuit, in Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., described conception as the mental act of forming, in the inventor's mind, a definite and permanent idea of a complete and operative invention. More specifically, a particular solution to the problem being solved must have formed in the human's mind. A general goal or a future research plan is not enough.

The Boundary of Conception

A General Research Goal vs. a Concrete Technical Solution

Examples that are unlikely to qualify as conception (general goals):

  • "Let's build a more efficient motor" / "Let's design a juicer with less vibration"
  • "Let's develop a more accurate AI model" / "Let's build a control system that saves energy"

Examples closer to conception (concrete technical solutions):

  • Arranging two rotating shafts at a specific angle and distance to avoid a resonance region
  • A training architecture combining specific data preprocessing with a specific penalty term
  • A closed-loop relationship that changes an actuation condition once a sensor signal crosses a threshold
  • A specific process range that produces an unexpected effect

The key question is not whether the inventor merely wanted a particular result, but whether they mentally settled on the concrete technical means for achieving it.

2.2 Conception Is Distinct From Reduction to Practice

Conception is the mental completion of the invention. Reduction to practice means actually building and testing the invention, or describing it in a patent application in a way that enables it to be practiced. Someone who builds a prototype from an already-completed design and confirms its performance may be an important research contributor. But if all they did was implement an already-completed technical concept in a routine way, that alone does not make them an inventor.

Human ActivityInventorship Assessment
Assembling a prototype exactly as the AI designed itIn principle, mere reduction to practice
Selecting a routine materialLikely a routine technical act
Merely confirming that the result worksLikely mere verification
Diagnosing the cause of failure and devising a new structurePossible contribution to conception
Fixing new numerical ranges and relationships based on experimentsPossible contribution to conception
Combining features of multiple candidates in a new wayPossible contribution to conception

3. The Standard for Joint Inventorship: The Pannu Factors

Pannu v. Iolab Corp. is the leading Federal Circuit decision on assessing joint inventorship among multiple natural persons. Since the 2025 revised guidance, these three factors are no longer used to compare a human against an AI. They are used to determine, among multiple natural persons, who made a qualitatively meaningful contribution to the claimed invention.

Pannu Factor 1

Contribute in Some Significant Manner

Each inventor must contribute in some significant manner to either the conception or the reduction to practice of the invention. Mere participation in reduction to practice is not enough — that contribution must rise above routine skill and connect to the formation of the claimed technical concept.

Pannu Factor 2

Not Insignificant in Quality When Measured Against the Full Invention

The contribution must be not insignificant in quality when measured against the dimension of the full invention. The standard is qualitative significance, not hours worked or volume of effort. Someone who proposed only a single element can be a joint inventor if that element is the key to solving the problem. Conversely, someone who participated in a long-running project but performed only routine testing, measurement, coding, or assembly may not be an inventor at all.

Pannu Factor 3

More Than Explaining Well-Known Concepts or the State of the Art

The contribution must go beyond simply explaining a well-known concept or the existing state of the art. The following, standing alone, generally will not make someone a joint inventor:

  • Advising the use of a known material / introducing a textbook algorithm
  • Explaining an industry standard / coding according to the inventor's specific instructions
  • Running routine tests on a completed design / selecting a known manufacturing process

4. The Five Principles of the 2024 Guidance: How Should They Be Read Today?

The 2024 USPTO guidance set out five principles. Since the 2025 guidance rescinded that guidance in its entirety, those principles no longer stand as an independent legal test. They still have reference value, however, as an analytical checklist showing what facts to investigate when applying the ordinary conception doctrine to an AI-assisted scenario.

Principle Under the 2024 GuidanceIts Current Legal Significance
Using AI does not negate inventorship AI is a tool; whether a human conceived the invention is what matters
Raising a general problem is not enough A particular solution is required
Mere reduction to practice or recognizing value is not enough Conception and reduction to practice are distinguished
Contributing to designing or training the AI can count It must connect to conception of the claimed invention
Mere ownership or oversight is not enough Inventorship and ownership are distinct questions

5. Four Types of AI-Assisted Invention

Type 1

Entering a General Prompt and Claiming the AI's Output As-Is

A researcher enters a general-purpose generative AI prompt — "Design a compact transmission suitable for a radio-controlled car" — and carries the AI's design into the drawings and claims with little or no modification. Here, the human has done no more than pose a general problem or goal; it is hard to say they conceived the concrete technical means of the invention as finally claimed. Merely recognizing that the AI's output is useful, or choosing to file for it, is not enough.

Assessment: In principle, human inventorship is likely to be denied. The conclusion could differ, however, if the original prompt itself already contained concrete structural relationships, numerical conditions, or operating principles.

Type 2

Building the AI's Design and Changing Only Routine Materials or Dimensions

The AI's design is actually built, and the exterior material is swapped from plastic to steel, or dimensions are adjusted within a routine range. A material substitution or dimensional change that a person of ordinary skill would make as a routine design choice is unlikely to be recognized as an independent act of conception.

Assessment: Inventorship is unlikely to be recognized in principle. But if the material change solved a previously unsolved problem by exploiting a relationship between a specific composite material's lay-up direction and its coefficient of thermal expansion, that could constitute a separate contribution to conception. What matters is not the magnitude of the change, but its qualitative significance to the technical core of the claimed invention.

Type 3

Testing the AI's Output and Redesigning the Structure and Conditions

The AI's design is used as a starting point, but the human uncovers defects through testing and substantially redesigns the structure. Suppose the AI's proposed transmission was installed in an actual device and, at a certain rpm, produced gear-mesh defects and vibration — and the engineer then changed the axial length of the housing, relocated the shafts, added support elements, designed a clip-fastening structure, and adjusted the gear ratio. In that case, the person who finalized the completed technical concept can fairly be said to be human.

Assessment: Human inventorship is likely to be recognized. But if the human's contribution appears only in dependent claims while the independent claim tracks the AI's output as-is, an inventorship problem can arise on a claim-by-claim basis.

Type 4

Improving the Design Through Iterative Prompting and Feedback

This is the hardest category — where the human never directly modifies the physical design, but incrementally improves the result by repeatedly adjusting the prompt.

  1. An initial prompt generates a general design.
  2. The human identifies a stress-concentration problem in the generated design.
  3. Load conditions, allowable stress, and manufacturing tolerances are added to the prompt.
  4. Exclusion conditions are set to rule out a specific shape.
  5. Simulation results are fed back into the AI.
  6. The objective function is revised to avoid a resonant frequency.
  7. Candidates are discarded or adopted for specific technical reasons.
  8. The final design is fixed based on the iterative results.

Here, the number of prompts does not matter. A single concrete technical constraint can be a more important contribution to conception than a hundred abstract instructions. Assessment: Inventorship may be recognized conditionally, but requires a claim-by-claim factual analysis.


6. Where Copyright and Patent Law Diverge on Iterative Prompting

The same act of prompting raises a different question depending on the body of law. Copyright law asks whether the human sufficiently determined the expressive elements of the final output. Patent law, by contrast, asks whether the human conceived the particular technical solution claimed in the invention.

A Key Proposition It does not necessarily follow that if iterative prompting alone cannot make someone the author of an AI-generated image, it likewise cannot make someone the inventor of AI-generated technology under the same reasoning. Even where authorship is denied under copyright law, a contribution to conception can still be recognized under patent law if the prompt contained the specific structure, constraints, and operating relationships of the claimed invention.

6.1 The Beijing Internet Court's Generative-AI Image Case

On November 27, 2023, China's Beijing Internet Court recognized copyright authorship for a human user in connection with an image generated using Stable Diffusion. What the court emphasized was not the raw number of inputs, but the selection and ordering of prompts, the setting of an expressive approach, the composition and arrangement of the image, parameter adjustments, the selection among generated results, and the aesthetic judgment reflected in the final output.

6.2 The U.S. Copyright Office's Approach: Supplying a Prompt Alone Is Generally Not Enough

In Part 2 of its AI report, released January 29, 2025, the U.S. Copyright Office concluded that merely supplying a prompt is generally not sufficient. Copyright law's core question is this:

Did the human supply only the idea, mood, or style they wanted, or did they actually determine the concrete expressive elements of the final output — the specific lines, colors, sentences, notes, or arrangement?

6.3 The Critique of "Sweat of the Brow"

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., held that copyright cannot be granted merely because substantial effort and expense went into compiling data. The number of prompt iterations and the amount of trial and error does not, by itself, establish expressive originality. The real question is this:

Did the human's repeated inputs and selections substantially determine the final expression, or did the human supply only preferences and ideas while the AI actually determined the expression?

6.4 Patent Law Looks at Technical Conception, Not Expression

Suppose a human instructed an AI as follows:

"Arrange the first and second shafts asymmetrically, limit the shaft spacing to 18–22 mm, and adjust the gear ratio to avoid a resonance band of 7,500–8,200 rpm. Exclude any structure whose maximum deflection exceeds 0.3 mm."

Suppose the AI generated a concrete CAD shape in response. Because the human did not personally determine every line and curved surface in the final drawing, the authorship of that CAD image can be debated separately. But the asymmetric arrangement of the two shafts, the numerical range for shaft spacing, the resonance band to be avoided, the gear-ratio-based solution principle, and the maximum-deflection exclusion condition — all contained in the prompt — can connect directly to conception under patent law.

Copyright LawPatent Law
What Is Protected Human-created expression The invention as defined by the claims
Core Question Did the human determine the expressive elements? Did the human conceive the technical solution?
A General Prompt Closer to an idea or instruction Closer to a general research goal
A Technically Constrained Prompt May still fall short without expressive control Can support conception if reflected in the claims
Number of Iterations Not originality in itself Not inventorship in itself
Unit of Analysis The final expression and the human-authored portion The claims and their technical limitations

7. Prompt Length or Repetition Count Is Not the Standard

What matters under patent law is not whether a prompt is long or literarily polished. A long sentence can still be nothing more than a general goal, and a short instruction can still contain a concrete technical solution.

Level 1

A General Goal

"Make it faster," "reduce vibration," "increase accuracy," "save energy"

→ Generally not recognized as conception.

Level 2

Search Conditions or Evaluation Criteria

A maximum-stress limit, excluding a specific material, minimizing energy consumption, avoiding a specific resonant frequency

→ May contribute to conception, but requires examining how much of the specific solution ultimately claimed it actually determined.

Level 3

A Concrete Technical Means

  • A structural relationship between specific components / a specific numerical range
  • A combination of data preprocessing and a loss function
  • A closed-loop relationship between a sensor signal and an actuation condition
  • A specific combination of substituents and reaction conditions
  • A relationship governing validation, rejection, and regeneration of AI outputs

→ If a human established this and it made its way into the final claims, it becomes strong evidence of conception.


8. Flash of Genius and the Paradox of Iterative Prompting

8.1 Cuno Engineering and the "Flash of Creative Genius"

In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., held that a new device being useful was not enough — it needed to reveal, beyond ordinary skill, a "flash of creative genius." That standard drew criticism, and when the 1952 Patent Act codified the non-obviousness standard in §103, it included the following principle:

Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

Patent law therefore does not favor an invention reached through long experimentation and iterative prompting over one reached through a single, elegant prompt, or vice versa. Non-obviousness is judged objectively, against the prior art and the person of ordinary skill in the art.

8.2 If Iterative Effort Isn't Credited on Its Own, Does That Protect Only a Single Prompt?

That concern has some validity, but it needs a doctrinal correction. Not crediting repeated effort as such is not the same thing as favoring a single prompt. The law does not choose between "a single flash of insight" and "sustained effort." Whichever path was taken, it asks whether a clear and lasting technical solution to the claimed invention actually formed in a human mind.

8.3 §103's "Manner of Invention" and Inventorship Must Be Kept Separate

Distinguishing Non-Obviousness From Inventorship Non-Obviousness (§103): Whether the invention was made with a single prompt or thousands of iterations does not, by itself, determine the §103 outcome.
Inventorship: It is still necessary to investigate which natural person, in the course of that iteration, established the concrete technical means recited in the claims — not how much effort was expended, but who recognized the technical problem, who formed the working hypothesis, who set the technical constraints, which results were discarded for which technical reasons, and whose judgment the final claim limitations trace back to.

9. An Integrated Test for Applying to Type 4

AI-assisted invention arising from iterative prompting can be assessed along four axes.

Axis 1

The Specificity of the Prompt Content

Did it state only a general goal, or did it include concrete structures, numbers, relationships, or process conditions?

Axis 2

The Human's Technical Diagnosis

Did the human technically identify a defect or the cause of a failure in the AI's output? There is a difference between simply disliking a result and diagnosing stress concentration, resonance, overfitting, toxicity, or degraded durability.

Axis 3

The Correspondence Between Human Input and the Claims

Did the condition the human added end up reflected in some limitation of the final claims? A sophisticated prompt that has nothing to do with the claimed invention is weak evidence of inventorship.

Axis 4

The Technical Character of the Selection

Was the reason for choosing the final candidate mere preference, or a technical judgment about operating principle, effect, manufacturability, or safety?

Form of Iterative PromptingCopyright AssessmentPatent Inventorship Assessment
Repeated adjustment of mood/style Depends on the degree of expressive control Low if unrelated to technical conception
Repeated requests for general performance improvement Depends on the outcome Likely just a general goal
Setting concrete structures/numbers May fall short without expressive control High if reflected in the claims
Revising conditions based on experimental results May be unrelated to copyright Strong evidence of conception
Selecting a candidate on aesthetic grounds May be recognized depending on jurisdiction Low absent a technical reason
Recognizing an unconventional effect and redesigning Separate from copyright High likelihood of recognized inventorship

10. Inventorship and Non-Obviousness Are Different Questions

A common error in AI-assisted invention is conflating inventorship with non-obviousness. Even where a human is a legitimate inventor, the invention can still be obvious. Conversely, even a technically highly non-obvious AI-generated result can raise an inventorship problem if no natural person actually conceived it.

Once AI becomes a routine research tool in a given field, the capabilities of the PHOSITA (person having ordinary skill in the art) can change too. Asserting an AI-augmented PHOSITA requires examining, at minimum, the following:

  • Did the relevant AI tool exist as of the filing date, and could a person of ordinary skill access it?
  • Was it actually in routine use in that field?
  • Did the prior art supply the necessary inputs and constraints?
  • Could a routine input have reached the claimed invention?
  • Was the AI's output technically reliable, or was there a reasonable expectation of success without experimentation?
An Important Distinction The fact that AI can generate a candidate is not the same thing as the claimed invention being obvious.

11. Is the Person Who Discovered and Selected an AI-Generated Candidate the Inventor?

AI can generate thousands, or millions, of candidates. Where one of them showed unexpected performance and a human discovered it and filed for patent protection, the basic rule is that mere after-the-fact recognition is not enough.

Selections That Contribute Weakly to Inventorship

Mere Hindsight Recognition

  • Adopting the AI's top-ranked recommendation as-is
  • Choosing a visually appealing shape / an arbitrary selection
  • Merely confirming that the result is useful
Selections That Can Be Part of Conception

Genuine Technical Reconstruction

  • A human discovers a physical principle the AI failed to capture
  • Recognizing an unconventional effect in a candidate that would ordinarily have been discarded
  • Fixing a new use and specific operating conditions
  • Combining features of multiple candidates in a new way
  • Deriving an independent structure or process from the AI's result

12. Software and AI Inventions Also Raise §101 Issues

Even where a legitimate human inventor exists, a §101 problem arises if the claim is directed to nothing more than an abstract idea. In 2025, the Federal Circuit in Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp. denied patent eligibility to claims that applied general-purpose machine learning to broadcast and event scheduling. In Ex parte Desjardins, by contrast, a concrete computational and control mechanism that adjusted parameters during training on a new task — so as to protect the model's performance on a prior task — was recognized as a technical improvement.

Recentive Analytics v. FoxEx Parte Desjardins
Nature of the TechnologyNew task application of general-purpose MLImproved ML training mechanism
Claiming StyleResult/function orientedComputation/control relationship oriented
Technical ProblemMaking a task more efficientKnowledge loss during continual learning (catastrophic forgetting)
Technical EffectFaster resultsReduced storage/complexity and knowledge preservation
§101IneligibleEligible

Specifications and claims should not stop at saying that "the AI analyzes," "optimizes," or "determines." They need to show which data structures, parameters, loss functions, iteration conditions, or signal relationships actually change how a computer or physical system operates.


13. Practical Recommendation for Companies #1: An Inventorship Evidence Ledger

In AI-assisted R&D, preserving only the final result makes it hard to reconstruct, after the fact, the relationship between a human's conception and the AI's output. Companies therefore need to maintain a structured Inventorship Evidence Ledger.

What the Ledger Should Contain

Materials to Accumulate in Chronological Order

  1. The original problem-definition document
  2. The solution hypothesis the human proposed
  3. The AI model and version used
  4. The system prompt and the user prompt
  5. Input data and constraints
  6. The AI's raw output
  7. Which candidates were adopted or discarded, and the reason for each
  8. Technical problems the human discovered
  9. Technical elements the human added or changed
  10. Test and simulation results / failure conditions and their causes
  11. Meeting notes attributed to individual inventors
  12. A mapping between the final claims and each human's contribution
  13. The allocation between patent and trade-secret protection

A prompt log alone is not enough. The record should also capture why a prompt was changed, which technical defect the human identified, and which claim limitation that judgment fed into.


14. Practical Recommendation for Companies #2: A Claim-to-Human-Contribution Matrix

Inventorship should not be assessed abstractly against the invention as a whole — it should be reviewed claim by claim.

Claim Feature Who First Proposed It Subsequent Human Contribution Supporting Evidence Candidate Inventor
Basic gear arrangement AI output None Output log Unclear
Asymmetric support structure Researcher A Designed after stress analysis CAD / meeting notes A
A specific gear-ratio range Researcher B Fixed through resonance-avoidance testing Test data B
Clip-fastening structure Researchers A & C Jointly designed Sketches / meeting notes A, C
Control algorithm Researcher D Designed the loss function and stopping condition Code history D
Risks Worth Catching Early An entire independent claim resting solely on AI output / a missing inventor on a dependent claim / a missing inventor from a collaborating institution / over-listing someone who was merely an implementer or manager / confusing inventorship with ownership / needing to update inventorship after a claim amendment

15. Practical Recommendation for Companies #3: A Technical Reproducibility Data Package

A strong AI patent comes not from the claim that "our researchers used AI creatively," but from objectively demonstrating the technical gap between a routine AI output and the final claimed invention.

Layer 1

The Technical Problem and a Baseline

Define the shortcomings of the existing technology using measurable data, along these lines (the figures below are illustrative drafting examples — actual numbers must be measured case by case):

  • The existing structure shows a sharp rise in vibration above a certain rotational speed
  • A conventional AI design exceeds the allowable stress by a certain margin
  • The existing model's accuracy on a prior task drops by a certain amount after continual learning
  • The conventional classification model reaches a certain false-positive rate on a particular data subgroup
Layer 2

AI Input and Control Structure

  • The model and version / input data format / variable ranges
  • Required and excluded conditions / the sequence of step-by-step queries
  • Output-selection criteria / regeneration conditions / points of human review / experimental and simulation feedback
Layer 3

Human Technical Intervention

  • Data preprocessing / feature extraction / changes to the objective or loss function
  • Setting physical constraints / modifying shape and layout
  • Designing the sensor-actuator relationship / diagnosing failure causes / combining and reconstructing candidates
Layer 4

Control Group and Experimental Group

Control group: a general-purpose AI, default settings, a routine prompt, results with no further human modification
Experimental group: unconventional conditions, proprietary data handling, experimental feedback, the human's final technical modifications

Layer 5

Ablation Studies and Failure Data

  • Results with the penalty term removed / results with a specific preprocessing step omitted
  • Results without human feedback / results outside the constraint range
  • Results using a different model / results with one prompt stage removed

This data can reinforce not just inventorship, but also non-obviousness and the nexus between the technical effect and the §112 enablement requirement.


16. Specification and Claim Drafting Strategy

16.1 Write the Mechanism, Not Just the Result

The following phrasing, alone, is not enough:

  • "Analyzes the data" / "determines the optimal result" / "improves accuracy"

Wherever possible, make it concrete:

  • Computing a feature vector from sensor values
  • Comparing the computed value against a stored threshold to generate a control signal
  • Iteratively adjusting parameters to minimize a defined loss function
  • Regenerating with revised constraints when the error falls outside the allowable range
  • Changing the operating state of an actual actuator based on the final output
Caveat Swapping words alone does not create patent eligibility. The actual technical means must exist in the specification and claims.

16.2 Draft the Original Specification Broadly and Deeply

  1. The broad system concept / data flow / data preprocessing
  2. Model architecture / the objective and loss functions / parameter ranges
  3. Integration with a physical system / concrete working examples / comparative experiments
  4. Failure conditions / alternative configurations / points of human intervention

This layered structure is what allows amendment without adding new matter during prosecution, and lets scope be adjusted through continuations.


17. A Corporate Checklist for Reporting AI-Assisted Inventions

Check 1 — Problem Definition

Identifying the Original Technical Problem

  • Who identified the original technical problem?
  • Was it a general goal, or an unconventional problem formulation?
  • What was the failure mode of the existing technology?
Check 2 — AI Use

Documenting How AI Was Used

  • Which model and version were used?
  • What data and conditions were entered?
  • How does the initial output differ from the final invention?
  • Were prompt changes wording tweaks, or changes to technical conditions?
Check 3 — Human Conception

Attributing Conception

  • Who set the key constraints?
  • Who discovered the defect in the AI's output?
  • Who modified the structure, values, or algorithm?
  • Who fixed the solution principle through experimental results?
  • Whose contribution does each claim feature trace back to?
Check 4 — Joint Inventorship

Confirming the Scope of Each Participant's Contribution

  • Which claims reflect which participant's contribution?
  • Who performed only implementation, testing, or management?
  • Was there a contribution beyond merely explaining well-known technology?
  • Does an amended claim require a change in named inventors?
Check 5 — Patentability and the Specification

Confirming Patentability and Specification Content

  • Could the same result have been reached with routine AI use?
  • Is there an unexpected effect / a comparison and objective data?
  • Can a person of ordinary skill reproduce the invention?
  • Are there working examples supporting the full scope of the claims?
Check 6 — Protection Strategy

Deciding How to Protect the IP

  • Which parts could a third party detect as infringement from outside?
  • Which know-how should stay confidential?
  • Should the claim be drafted around the system process rather than the prompt wording?
  • Are access permissions and version control in place for prompts and AI workflow protocols?

18. Conclusion: The AI-Era Inventor Is the Human Who Created the Technical Gap

Inventorship in AI-assisted invention is not a question of comparing who was more creative, the AI or the human. Under current U.S. law, AI cannot be an inventor. But the mere fact that AI was used neither negates nor establishes a human's inventorship. What matters is which natural person contributed to the conception of the specific technical concept ultimately claimed.

Someone who enters a general goal and simply adopts the AI's output is unlikely to be recognized as an inventor. The same is true of someone who merely builds the AI's output or swaps in routine materials. By contrast, someone who tests the AI's proposed candidates, diagnoses their defects, and substantially redesigns the structure, conditions, or control principle is likely to qualify as an inventor.

Copyright law asks whether the human controlled the final expression; patent law asks whether the human conceived a concrete technical solution. So even if a prompt amounts to nothing more than supplying an idea under copyright law, a contribution to conception can still be recognized under patent law if it contained the specific structure, values, and relationships of the final claimed invention. Conversely, even hundreds of rounds of prompting will not establish inventorship if all they did was repeat a general goal and preference.

What matters is not the claim that "our researchers used AI very creatively," but the demonstration that
"a routine AI output combined with the prior art could not have reached this technical configuration and effect, and a human researcher specifically designed and validated this gap."

Key Takeaway The AI-era inventor may no longer mean only someone who completes every technical detail alone, in their own head. But a human who, even while using powerful AI, designs a technical leap that could not routinely have been reached, proves that leap with objective data, and converts it into technical knowledge society can reproduce, remains exactly the actor the patent system needs to protect and induce.

19. A Question Left Open: Does the Patent System Still Work Once AI Conceives on Its Own?

Push one step further, though, and a more fundamental question comes into view.

If, in the near future, AI begins to independently identify the shortcomings of existing technology and generate the technical conception needed to fix them, will the patent system still be useful as a way to induce disclosure and inventive activity?

The four types and the conception-attribution analysis in this article all rest on the premise that a human is using AI as a tool. Give an AI the right reward function and search algorithm, and couldn't it generate new solutions — and disclose them on its own — without any separate economic reward or exclusive right? Would granting exclusivity over an AI-generated invention still promote innovation in that world, or would a patent instead become a barrier that blocks the next wave of researchers and businesses from entering the market and building on that work?

If so, shouldn't the center of protection shift away from the invention's output itself and toward the human-designed prompts and workframes, the way the problem was framed, the validation procedures, and the overall structure of how AI is deployed? The Inventorship Evidence Ledger in Chapter 13 and the patent/trade-secret layering strategy in Chapter 17, Check 6, already show an early form of that shift — even now, before AI conceives inventions on its own. And rather than letting those prompts and workframes sit hidden away as trade secrets and know-how, don't we need a new form of protection — one that induces disclosure to society while still providing a fair reward?

The Question Worth Asking Again In an era where AI does the inventing, the question we need to revisit may not simply be "should we recognize AI as an inventor?" The more essential question is this: "What should the AI-era patent system protect, whom should it reward, and what kind of knowledge disclosure should it induce?"

References and Official Sources

  • USPTO, Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions, 89 Fed. Reg. 10043 (February 13, 2024) Federal Register The original guidance applying the Pannu factors to AI-assisted invention; fully rescinded in November 2025.
  • USPTO, Revised Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions (announced November 26, 2025; published in the Federal Register November 28, 2025) Federal Register Rescinds the 2024 guidance in its entirety and returns to the traditional conception doctrine (the natural-person inventor standard).
  • Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) The leading decision establishing the three-factor test for joint inventorship among multiple natural persons.
  • Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994) Defines conception as the touchstone of inventorship and distinguishes conception from reduction to practice.
  • Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941) The source of the "flash of creative genius" language; the 1952 Patent Act's §103 codified the principle that patentability does not turn on the manner of invention.
  • Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) Confirms that the standard for copyright is independent creation and minimal creativity, not labor; rejects the "sweat of the brow" theory.
  • Recentive Analytics, Inc. v. Fox Corp., 134 F.4th 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2025) Held that applying general-purpose ML to a new task domain does not, by itself, satisfy §101 eligibility.
  • Ex parte Desjardins, Appeal No. 2024-000567 (USPTO Appeals Review Panel, 2025) Recognized §101 eligibility for a continual-learning claim that adjusts parameters to protect performance on a prior task while learning a new one. Decided September 26, 2025; designated precedential on November 4, 2025.
  • U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence — Part 2: Copyrightability (January 29, 2025) Copyright Office AI Policy Page An official report addressing the copyrightability of generative-AI output and why supplying a prompt alone generally falls short.
  • Beijing Internet Court, Li v. Liu — Stable Diffusion Image Copyright Case, (2023) Jing 0491 Min Chu No. 11279 (decided November 27, 2023) A Chinese decision recognizing copyrightability in an AI-generated image where aesthetic judgment was reflected in the selection, ordering, and parameter adjustment of prompts and in the composition of the image.
A Note on the Use of Legal Information This article is a general comparative and policy analysis, not legal advice on any particular case. Statutes, examination guidance, and case law can change or apply differently depending on the facts, so any actual filing, appeal, or litigation should be based on the most current primary sources and the advice of qualified counsel in the relevant jurisdiction.

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